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 10 
Here we demonstrate that speakers at the press conference for the publication of the 11 
IPCC’s Assessment Report 5 (Working Group 1)
1
 attempted to make the documented 12 
broad certainty of anthropogenic global warming (AGW) more meaningful to the 13 
public. Speakers sought such meaning through reference to short-term temperature 14 
increases. However, when journalists inquired about the similarly short-lengthed 15 
‘pause’
2
 in global temperature increase, the speakers dismissed the relevance of such 16 
timescales, thus becoming incoherent as to ‘what counts’ as scientific evidence for 17 
AGW. We call this the ‘IPCC’s certainty trap’. Speakers’ incoherence led to confusion 18 
within the press conference and subsequent condemnation in the media
3
. While the 19 
speakers were well intentioned in their attempts to communicate the public implications 20 
of the report, these attempts threatened to erode their scientific credibility. In this 21 
instance, the certainty trap was the result of the speakers’ failure to acknowledge the 22 
tensions between scientific and public meanings. Avoiding the certainty trap in the 23 
future will require a nuanced accommodation of ongoing uncertainties and a 24 
recognition that rightful demands for scientific credibility need to be balanced with 25 
 2 
public and political dialogue about the things we value and the actions we take to 26 
protect those things
4–6
.  27 
 28 
In this paper, we assess the relationship between two fundamentals of science 29 
communication: uncertainty and meaning. Uncertainties are everyday matters of concern for 30 
scientists. The majority can be called ‘local’ uncertainties
7
 as they reflect an uncertainty 31 
manifest within a single phenomenon. Climate science is replete with such local 32 
uncertainties
8
. Here, we focus on temporally local uncertainties which were the subject of a 33 
number of questions and answers in the press conference under consideration. Examples of 34 
temporally local uncertainties in climate science include the variable effects of volcanoes, 35 
solar cycles, climate sensitivity, El Niño, and the impact of the financial crisis on emissions. 36 
While some of these phenomena are spatially huge, they are temporally local in the sense that 37 
they are hypothesised to have short-term effects and require resolution within broader 38 
theoretical frameoworks
7,8
. And yet these problematic, temporally local, uncertainties are 39 
inevitably encountered by climate scientists seeking to produce broader certainties; namely 40 
the concrete, theoretical explanation and detection of Anthropogenic Global Warming 41 
(AGW). 42 
 43 
A second crucial issue, for those concerned with science communication, is that of meaning. 44 
Meaning arises from personal experiences embedded in the local contexts within which 45 
people create and value their lives
4,9
. Acknowledging the importance of local contexts 46 
highlights how different spheres of meaning become relevant in making science public. For 47 
example, a comparison of professional and popular science writing
10
 has shown that the 48 
characteristics of scientific claims shift as knowledge is translated from scholarly journals 49 
into more widely read publications. Journal articles largely restrict themselves to answering 
 3 
questions of scientific meaning: ‘what happened?’ and ‘what was the reason for the event?’ 51 
Wider audiences, however, are concerned with questions of public meaning related to their 52 
own local contexts: ‘what value should be placed on the event?’ and ‘what action should now 53 
be taken?’  54 
 55 
Negotiating the boundary between ‘scientific meaning’ and ‘public meaning’ is a particular 56 
concern for the IPCC for two reasons. First, while the IPCC is committed to providing 57 
policy-neutral advice
11
, it also seeks to facilitate greater understanding of its work amongst 58 
non-specialist audiences
12
, and there are calls for such objectives to be achieved not only 59 
through an increased supply of scientific knowledge but also through such knowledge being 60 
made more publicly meaningful
4,5
. Second, representatives of the IPCC are requested to give 61 
press conferences, events which sit at the boundary between science and the media
13
 wherein 62 
officials can make meaning beyond the text and demonstrate authority while still exerting a 63 
degree of control
14
. Here we examine this boundary, building on previous literature on the 64 
communication of climate science uncertainties
15,16
 with a qualitative analysis of a novel and 65 
important data source: the press conference transcript.  66 
 67 
We argue here that a relationship exists between certainty and meaning in climate science, 68 
that a framework for understanding this relationship can be formed, and that this framework 69 
can be explored using the IPCC as a test case. We do not claim that understanding meaning, 70 
certainty, or the relationship between them is straightforward. Following others
5,17,18
 we do, 71 
however, believe that it is reasonable to treat the two concepts as independent of one another, 72 
although further empirical research into the question will be valuable. Investigating the 73 
relationship between certainty and meaning is also useful in helping to understand 74 
 4 
interactions during the press conference under consideration and the activities of the IPCC 75 
more broadly.  76 
 77 
The degree of certainty regarding AGW has increased since the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 78 
Report in 2007
1
. Indeed, various calls for action on AGW have been premised upon this 79 
increasing certainty
19
. Simultaneously, however, there is a widely-held belief, following 80 
criticisms
4
, that increased certainty has yet to manifest into public meanings powerful enough 81 
to prompt significant personal, political and policy responses (see Fig. 1). That is not to say 82 
that no public meanings about climate change have developed during the lifetime of the 83 
IPCC
20,21
, rather that the certainty of climate change knowledge continues to have greater 84 
scientific than public meaning. 85 
 86 
During the press conference, the IPCC speakers attempted to make climate knowledge more 87 
publicly meaningful by repeated reference to temporally local phenomena such as short-term 88 
temperature change. However, as described above, there are more uncertainties around the 89 
causes of these phenomena and whether they are indeed attributable to AGW. Furthermore, 90 
these phenomena are of a kind with other uncertain, temporally local phenomena such as ‘the 91 
pause’
2
 which do not incontrovertibly support the AGW hypothesis. Thus, attempts to 92 
increase public meaning through a discussion of temporally local phenomena in this way are 93 
coupled with an erosion of certainty. In this press conference, the IPCC speakers failed to 94 
acknowledge this diminishing certainty, dismissing journalists’ questions about ‘the pause’ 95 
precisely because the phenomenon is uncertain. The simultaneous reliance upon some 96 
temporally local events in order to increase public meaning, and dismissal of other similar 97 
events because they are uncertain, led to confusion, incoherence and negative press coverage 98 
 5 
following the press conference. This is the certainty trap which the IPCC must avoid in 99 
future. 100 
 101 
During the press conference in Stockholm, and in the terms outlined above, there were 102 
frequent considerations of ‘the value which should be placed on AGW’ and considerations of 103 
‘what should be done’. In a particularly passionate passage, the World Meteorological 104 
Organization’s Michel Jarraud (see Methods for further information on speakers’ 105 
organisational roles) argued that “[The] report demonstrates that we must greatly reduce 106 
global emissions in order to avoid the worst effects of climate change” (Jarraud L90-92, 107 
emphasis added). The information, delivered in WG1’s report, “can be use, that should be 108 
used to produce actionable climate information” (L94-96; see Supplementary Information A 109 
for full transcript). There are two observations to be made about these extracts. First, there 110 
seems little doubt that Jarraud attached a great deal of meaning to AGW and believed 111 
particular actions – most notably a significant reduction in global emissions – should be 112 
undertaken. What is also clear, in the repeated use of terms such as “our time” (IPCC’s 113 
Thomas Stocker, L345-346), “our planet” (United Nations Environment Programme’s Achim 114 
Steiner L129), “our only home” (Stocker L507), “our activities” (Jarraud L69), and “we must 115 
greatly reduce global emissions” (Jarraud L90-91) is that the speakers believed AGW to be 116 
meaningful for a collective which is broader than the scientific community, although 117 
ultimately this collective remains unspecified. Second, Jarraud sought to give climate change 118 
meaning through certainty. It is ‘the report’ which ‘can be used, should be used’ and which 119 
‘demonstrates’ the need for action. Within the press conference, the speakers attempt to 120 
leverage scientific certainty to procure public meaning (Fig. 2).  121 
 122 
 6 
The problem for the press conference speakers was that, while they clearly thought that the 123 
certainty of AGW demonstrated the need for public action, it is not entirely clear why that 124 
argument should have been publicly persuasive given that literature in the social sciences 125 
strongly suggests that little public meaning has been successfully attached to this aggregated, 126 
abstract notion of climate
4,5
. Perhaps acknowledging this, speakers attempted to make AGW 127 
meaningful by temporally localising the terms of reference, focusing particularly upon recent 128 
and short-term climate changes. For example, Jarraud (L84-85), Stocker (L418-420) and the 129 
IPCC’s Rajenda Pachauri emphasised the fact that “the decade 2001 onwards having been the 130 
hottest, the warmest that we have seen” (Pachauri L261-262). Focusing upon these recent 131 
decades, we suggest, began to give AGW meaning by situating it within the “normal horizons 132 
of time” rather than the epic timescales which are the usual currency of climate science
4 
(for 133 
an extended version of this analysis, see Supplementary Information B).  134 
 135 
However, while a focus on the decadal scale may have helped to make climate change more 136 
meaningful it also brought considerable difficulties, in large part because press conference 137 
speakers asserted that “periods of less than around thirty years… are less relevant” (Stocker, 138 
L582-583). Thus, publicly meaningful phenomena were actually incorporated at the expense 139 
of certainty (Fig. 3).  140 
 141 
What became apparent throughout the press conference is that increasing public meaning at 142 
the expense of certainty was particularly problematic, not least because of journalists’ 143 
extended focus upon the ‘hiatus’ or ‘pause’
2
 in the rate of increase in global mean surface 144 
temperature since the late 1990s. The pause was brought into play once timeframes of less 145 
than thirty years were considered relevant for assessment by the press conference speakers. 146 
Thus, by temporally localising AGW in order to give the debate meaning, the spotlight also 147 
 7 
fell upon sources of scientific uncertainty. This did not escape the attention of journalists at 148 
the press conference, who were particularly interested in this temporally meaningful pause 149 
(for an extended version of this analysis, see Supplementary Information C), with six out of 150 
eighteen journalists asking whether the pause undermined the IPCC’s findings. David Rose 151 
of the UK’s Mail on Sunday tackled the topic forcefully, asking “how much longer will the 152 
so-called pause or hiatus have to continue before you would begin to reflect that there is 153 
something fundamentally wrong with the models?” (L772-774). 154 
 155 
Various attempts were made by the IPCC speakers to downplay the importance of the pause. 156 
Stocker repeatedly pinpointed a lack of published literature as a problem (L436-437, L568-157 
571) and claimed that temperature trends that last for less than thirty years should be treated 158 
as significantly less important than trends that last over thirty years (L580-584, L793-795). 159 
This ‘temporal segmentation’
7
 enabled the pause to be dismissed as scientifically irrelevant, 160 
suggesting that journalists’ questions on the matter could be ignored. Jarraud offered just 161 
such a dismissal to Rose’s question, which he claimed was “from a scientific point of view... 162 
what we would call an ill-posed question” (L827-828), essentially dismissing Rose as 163 
scientifically illiterate. The terms of this dismissal, however, appear inconsistent with the 164 
temporally localised claims made by speakers during the press conference. The speakers 165 
oscillated between two positions: one of broad certainty but little public meaning, the other of 166 
public meaning but little broad certainty (fig. 4). This striking incoherence was noted by Alex 167 
Morales of Bloomberg News who asked why fifteen year periods are considered by the 168 
speakers if they hold no scientific value (L965-969).  169 
 170 
When Rose
3
 published his article the following day, the quote “your question is ill-posed!” 171 
was given headline status, and derided as a misjudged response to “a simple question”. We 172 
 8 
do not wish to claim here that Rose was particularly sympathetic to the IPCC prior to the 173 
press conference
22,23
, but in this instance his question was well-founded. It exposed how 174 
attempts during the press conference to increase public meaning undermined the very 175 
scientific certainty that representatives were trying to communicate, and then leverage, in 176 
order to procure public meaning.  177 
 178 
Climate change is a science/policy arena where consistent attempts are made to communicate 179 
the certainty of AGW theory, and the broad level of consensus over certain facets of that 180 
theory in the literature
24,25
. Within this context, a spotlight on scientific uncertainties may be 181 
regarded as unwelcome, as the pause proved to be in the press conference. However, we 182 
argue that this spotlight is an unavoidable byproduct of attempts to make scientific certainty 183 
publicly meaningful by emphasising the temporally local.  184 
 185 
This insight implies that seeking to persuade citizens of the case for climate action solely 186 
through expositions of the certainty of AGW, and the scientific consensus on the topic, may 187 
be a moribund strategy. For while the IPCC has been able to establish greater certainty 188 
around AGW (Figure 1) the attempts by IPCC speakers at the press conference to ground 189 
their conclusions with reference to temporally local, publicly meaningful events (Figure 2) 190 
threatened the credibility of the certainty they wished to convey (Figure 3). This was not lost 191 
on the assembled media, whose questions prompted an incoherently oscillating position 192 
regarding the appropriate timescales to be considered within climate science (Figure 4). If 193 
IPCC speakers are to avoid this certainty trap in the future, they must be better availed of the 194 
competing tensions between scientific certainty and public meaning, and the particular 195 
difficulties faced by scientists when trying to communicate their findings in a meaningful 196 
fashion. In particular, public dialogue has a key role to play in making climate science 197 
 9 
knowledge meaningful. We should strive for an approach to climate change which breaks 198 
free of the certainty trap to better include public dialogue, values, visions and 199 
beliefs
4,6,17,20,26,27
. 200 
 201 
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Figure Legends 284 
 285 
Fig. 1: Since the last IPCC report, certainty has increased concerning AGW. Speakers at the 286 
press conference stressed this increase:  287 
 12 
 “the evidence for human influence has grown since AR4, it is now deemed 288 
 extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed 289 
 warming.” (Steiner L153-155).  290 
However, social scientific research has argued
4
 that the issue of AGW is yet to attain enough 291 
public meaning to prompt significant personal, political and policy responses. Figure 1 thus 292 
shows an upward shift along the y-axis, representing increased broad certainty, but no 293 
movement on the x-axis, representing the continued dominance of scientific meaning. 294 
 
295 
Fig. 2: Within the press conference, speakers attempted to leverage the certainty 296 
demonstrated in the AR5 report – a report which is explicitly not concerned with public or 297 
society – in order to procure public meaning and policy change: 298 
  “[The] report demonstrates that we must greatly reduce global emissions in order  to 299 
 avoid the worst effects of climate change.” (Jarraud L90-92) 300 
In Figure 2 we represent this move with a horizontal shift along the x-axis (to position 3); a 301 
utilization of certainty in order to procure public meaning.  302 
 303 
 Fig. 3: The speakers drew upon temporally local events in order to give AGW public 304 
meaning during the press conference: 305 
 “the decade 2001 onwards having been the hottest, the warmest that we have seen” 306 
 (Pachauri L261-263).  307 
The speakers understood these temporally local phenomena to be less certain than the overall 308 
theory of AGW: 309 
  “periods of less than around thirty years… are less relevant” (Stocker, L582-583).  310 
 13 
Thus, publically meaningful phenomena were actually incorporated at the expense of 311 
certainty. Therefore, the intended move to the top-right quadrant (position three) was not 312 
achieved. Instead the move was to the bottom-right quadrant (position four).  313 
 314 
Fig. 4: Drawing upon temporally local, publically meaningful information (‘the hottest 315 
decade’) proved problematic, as it lent legitimacy to the discussion of other local 316 
uncertainties, such as the 15-year ‘pause’. Speakers were repeatedly challenged on the 317 
uncertainties connected to this phenomenon: 318 
  “Your climate change models did not predict there was a slowdown in the warming. 319 
 How can we be sure about your predicted projections for future warming?” 320 
 (Harrabin L560-562)  321 
Faced with these challenges, speakers retreated from temporally local, publicly meaningful 322 
data (position 4) to reaffirm AGW’s broad certainty (position 2): 323 
  “we are very clear in our report that it is inappropriate to compare a short term 324 
 period  of observations with model performance” (Stocker L794-796).  325 
This retreat led to confusion, incoherence, and criticism within the press conference.    326 
Methods 1 
 2 
Publication in journals cannot be relied upon as a means of communicating research outputs 3 
beyond the scientific community; less than 0.005% of scientific papers outside of health and 4 
medicine were reported in the mass media between 1990 and 2001
28
.  Press conferences, 5 
therefore, are a means for scientists to reach non-specialist audiences and provide an 6 
important location for the study of science communication. Where the issue under 7 
consideration is of political importance, such as climate change, press conferences take on 8 
greater significance as they offer a demarcation line between the relatively closed processes 9 
of scientific assessment, during which the publication of provisional findings are likely to be 10 
discouraged, and the point at which a peer-reviewed scientific publication can be made public 11 
via the media
13
. Thus, the press conference represents a “constitutional stage” upon which 12 
officials can impart meaning beyond the text and demonstrate authority, while still exerting a 13 
degree of control over proceedings
14
. The press conference also, however, marks the point at 14 
which the authors of a report begin to lose control of meaning, the inescapable moment at 15 
which the report begins to take on a life of its own following publication.  16 
 17 
Despite the importance and unique features of a scientific press conference, there are no 18 
detailed analyses of these events in the literature, although they are acknowledged as a part of 19 
the difficult boundary between science and the media
13,29,30
. This paper begins to address this 20 
empirical gap by examining the IPCC press conference held in Stockholm, Sweden on 21 
September 27, 2013 to present the Summary for Policymakers for Working Group 1 of the 22 
Fifth Assessment Report
1
.  23 
 24 
The press conference began with a sequence of presentations by six speakers: 25 
 Ban Ki-Moon (United Nations) 26 
 Michel Jarraud (Secretary General, World Meteorological Organization) 27 
 Achim Steiner (Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme) 28 
 Rajenda K. Pachauri (Chair, IPCC) 29 
 Qin Dahe (Co-Chair, IPCC WG1) 30 
 Thomas Stocker (Co-Chair, IPCC WG1)  31 
The presentations were followed by questions from a total of 18 journalists, all but one of 32 
which were answered by Jarraud, Pachauri or Stocker. We viewed the press conference as it 33 
was aired live on BBC News 24 and subsequently transcribed a recording. The transcript is 34 
12,400 words in length and is presented in full in Supplementary Information A. The 35 
transcript is produced verbatim from the words uttered during the press conference and 36 
apparent errors of speech have not been corrected. Quotes taken from the transcript are 37 
supplied with line numbers, to ease cross-referencing with the full transcript. 38 
 39 
The transcript was coded for language related to the two categories being studied: meaning 40 
and certainty. Our understanding of meaning arises from work conducted by Fahnestock, who 41 
provides a simple taxonomy of four questions which account for the development of issues in 42 
the public sphere; ‘what happened?, ‘what is the reason for the event?’, ‘what value should be 43 
placed upon the event?’, and ‘what action should be taken now?’
10
. In her comparison of 44 
professional and popular science writing, Fahnestock shows how the characteristics of claims 45 
shift as knowledge is translated from scholarly journals into more widely read publications. 46 
In particular, Fahnestock shows that journal articles largely restrict themselves to answering 47 
the question ‘what happened?’, allocating considerable space to validating the answer to the 48 
question through a description of research methods. Wider audiences, however, are 49 
concerned with larger public issues than the deliberately restricted claims served up for a 50 
narrow audience of specialist scientists. Such concerns lead on to questions concerned with 51 
the causality, value and implications of an event. Following Fahnestock, therefore, we were 52 
able to code statements relating to meaning into one of four categories and determine whether 53 
utterances had more in common with the statements most frequently found in scientific 54 
publications (‘scientific meaning’) or the public sphere (‘public meaning’).   55 
 56 
Similarly, we searched for utterances concerned with the certainty of scientific findings. We 57 
used Star’s
7,31
 division between ‘local’ and ‘global’ (here renamed local and broad), as well 58 
as specific literatures relating to climate change
4,8,9
 to determine whether certainty-statements 59 
referred to large or small scale (temporally and spatially) events. When explanations for 60 
uncertainty were proffered, we again referred to literature from sociology and science and 61 
technology studies, which has considered this question in depth, in order to classify the nature 62 
of those responses
7,15,16,31–35
. 63 
 64 
Finally, we identified patterns in the data which were suggestive of a relationship between 65 
these two categories of certainty and meaning, and employed principles of narrative analysis 66 
to ensure, firstly, the veracity and faithfulness of our data interpretation
36
 and, secondly, that 67 
the data presented provide a robust representation of how the IPCC speakers communicated 68 
during the press conference. 69 
 70 
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